



A Comparative Study on Doctrines and Principles for Multidimensional Peace Operations: A Case for Harmonization and Enhanced Interoperability¹

I. The Environment Up to 2015

1. The Challenge. Internal armed conflicts constitute the vast majority of today's wars. The paradigm shift from inter-state, Clausewitzian conflict to intra-state civil wars has been a well-tracked phenomenon caused by the post Cold War decompression. Most of these conflicts take place in the world's poorest countries where State capacity may be weak and where many belligerents are motivated by economic gain as much as by ideology or past grievances. They have led to a surge in the international response, which has tried to handle situations across the spectrum of conflict from traditional peacekeeping (characterized by high consent and low capability), to peace enforcement (characterized by much lower levels of consent and much higher levels of capability). These operations have been conducted by the United Nations, by regional and sub-regional organizations, by coalitions of the willing and unilaterally by states. Some have been mandated by the UN's Security Council, the body under international law responsible for international peace and security, and some have not. All have involved troops from sovereign states, troops funded and trained for national defence but having to adapt their procedures to the support of peace. Most have been conducted without recourse to an enabling conceptual framework articulating the principles and processes needed to guide external intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state. The challenge for all, with the resources available, has been how to help the state under stress make the transition from conflict and violence to one of sustained peace and development.

2. The Need for a Comprehensive Approach. To meet this challenge organisations involved in peace operations since the late 1990s have recognized that a comprehensive approach is required; namely an approach which harnesses and coordinates the many actors and operational activities needed to create a lasting and sustainable change. Experience within the UN and the World Bank has shown that intra-state conflict is cyclical and will reoccur if the underlying causes of conflict are not addressed. It is insufficient merely to integrate or coordinate the effort of those involved in providing security (combined or joint military operations). This approach prevalent in the 1990s and still evident today only tackles the symptoms of conflict. In order to address the complex causes of conflict, an integrated, a whole of government, or comprehensive approach, is needed, which can

¹ A Commissioned Paper for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, by Maj Gen (Retd) Robert DS Gordon, Former Force Commander UNMEE / DPKO Consultant on Doctrine Development/ Challenges Forum Consultant on Comparative Doctrine Development.

coordinate the efforts of all the many national and international agencies, departments and organisations needed to achieve a sustainable peace. Despite this recognition, most actors involved in peace operations have been unsuccessful (or slow at best), in operationalizing the conceptual shift from joint military operations in support of peace to comprehensive peace operations. There is a natural friction in the system, be it national or international, driven largely by funding considerations, bureaucratic structures and stove-piped responsibilities, which makes it inherently difficult to tackle, in a coordinated and comprehensive way, the complex challenges involved in turning internal conflict into a sustainable peace. It is predictable therefore that in response to this difficulty and with no shortage of threats to peace looming over the horizon, there will be an increased focus and effort during the next decade on getting the corporate act together for peace operations.

3. The Rise of Multi-Lateral Operations. At the same time, because the global demand for peace operations has far outstripped the capacity of any single actor (including the UN as currently organised), there have emerged regional and sub-regional organisations willing to take their share of the burden as envisaged under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. There have been advantages in this widening and deepening of the international response to conflict. An inevitable consequence however of this development, has been role specialization, where more than one international or national organisation has been involved in the same peace operation, and thereby complicating the challenges further. The latest iteration of this tendency has been the emerging Darfur operation, UNAMID, where joint command and control relationships and deployments have been constructed between the UN and the AU. The implications and doctrinal lessons from this operation have yet to be captured, but they will be critical to assess as the operation unfolds. It is clear that the future up to 2015 will see an increasing involvement of organisations, other than the UN, in peace operations. They may work with each other or in place of each other, or hand over to each other; with the UN (on the grounds of its over-arching legitimacy), likely to be involved at some level in most relationships. While such multi-lateral peace operations will not replace UN peace operations, it is likely that they will become more commonplace, as the capacity and competence of regional and sub-regional organisations develops.

4. The Need for a Doctrinal Framework. Two related pressures emerge in this environment. Both are underpinned by the need for a unifying conceptual and guidance framework for peace operations. First is the requirement and difficulty in developing a holistic or comprehensive approach to multidimensional peace operations. Second is the increasing trend towards multi-lateral peace operations with the interoperability and coordination challenges that they generate. The work accompanying the UN Secretary-General's Reform Agenda in 2005 identified the need for a doctrine for UN peacekeeping. While not the first UN articulation of this concept, it was the first time that the word doctrine had been stated at the policy level as one of the components "essential to successful peace operations".² Doctrine has been a fraught word within the UN. It held connotations of militarism (and still has in some quarters) or restrictive and imposed standards at odds with the pluralism of the UN.³ Nevertheless, in the rush of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, individual member states began to develop their own doctrines for peacekeeping (or "operations other than war"). These were principally designed to guide the training and employment of their war-fighting armed forces in the burgeoning business of "peace support operations". At first they differentiated between peace support and warfighting operations, using the notion of the line of consent to demarcate between the two. More recently, states who have considered these issues have tended to identify a continuum in military operations from consensual peace keeping through

² USG DPKO Peace Operations 2010 dated 30 Nov 05.

³ The Oxford English Dictionary definition of doctrine is "a set of beliefs and principles held and taught by a church, a political party or other group".

confrontational peace enforcement to war-fighting.⁴ The military component of these operations have been trained to operate throughout this continuum according to the nature of the prevailing operational conditions.⁵ The result has been that while individual member states have come to peacekeeping missions with their various (and differing) *military* doctrines for peace operations, the international organizations responsible for collective peace and security, (particularly the United Nations, but also the regional organizations) have had, until very recently, no such overarching guidance. This has clearly been a serious omission, which all organizations have striven to rectify in the last 5 years.

II. Outline of Paper

5. This paper will examine the state of this doctrinal development in international organizations involved in peace operations (including the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and assess their ability to meet the challenges of future international peace operations; making recommendations for the direction of further development where appropriate. For the purposes of this paper, the UN working definition for peace operations doctrine suffices: “the evolving body of institutional guidance that provides support and direction to personnel preparing for, planning and implementing (UN) peace operations.” This paper does not attempt to address the doctrines of individual states designed for the deployment of their armed forces, police or civilian personnel.

III. Contrasting Evolutions of UN, AU, EU and NATO

6. The international organisations looked at in this paper, and currently involved in peace operations, have come to their present position by very different routes. In the case of the UN, there is no mention of peacekeeping activity in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, the UN has been in the business of peace operations for 60 years and the development of its peacekeeping capacity has been more measured (if susceptible to periodic surges such as in the mid 1990s and in this decade).⁶ However, even the UN has seen a major shift in its interpretation and practice of peacekeeping. It has moved from the traditional interpositioning/monitoring/ verifying activities (associated with ceasefires and interstate conflict) undertaken by lightly equipped peacekeepers, to integrated, multi-disciplinary peace operations (associated with intra-state conflict, comprehensive peace agreements and peacebuilding) undertaken by a broad spectrum of political, military, humanitarian, and developmental actors under a unified political leadership.

7. The youngest organisation, the African Union, was formed in 2002 out of the Organisation for African Unity. It was modelled on the EU and formed in recognition that African states must collectively have ownership for holistic solutions to the problems besetting its member states. As part of this initiative, from the outset, it gave itself clear and demanding peace and security goals. However, the nature and immediacy of the challenges within the African continent are such that the AU has been compared (by its officials) to a plane which is still being built while airborne. The AU, from its formation, has found itself deeply involved in African peace operations, while trying to build its own institutional capacity to address the continent’s challenges.⁷

⁴ In light of some bitter experience in Somalia 1993, Rwanda 1994 and Former Republic of Yugoslavia 1995.

⁵ This led to the late 1990s notion of the Three Block War in which the same soldiers in three contiguous city blocks may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief.

⁶ Since the UN’s first deployment to the Middle East in 1948 (UNTSO).

⁷ AU peace operations in Burundi 2003, Darfur 2005 and Somalia 2007.

8. The European Union started as an economic community, but has progressively moved towards political union and supranational government. In the process, it has developed a significant economic capability, which it uses for international capacity building.⁸ Additionally and recently, it has started to develop an integral capability for peace operations, initially under its 1992 Petersberg tasks,⁹ which are now articulated through its emerging, but still developing, European Security and Defence Policy. Much effort has had to be extended to differentiate such policies from those of NATO, given that there is considerable overlap in the membership of these two essentially Western organisations.

9. NATO was created as a system of collective defence for its Western democratic member states, whereby its member states agreed to a mutual defence of any other member state in response to an attack by any external party. As such it was a product of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of asymmetrical (including terrorist) threats from outside its former area of responsibility, NATO has progressively sought a more global role to leverage its advanced military-technical capabilities in support of international peace and security.

IV. Current Capability and Future Vision

10. The UN is clearly the big international player in the business of peace operations. From a small Headquarters in New York, it runs 19 missions on four continents, with start-up planning in train for three more.¹⁰ It currently deploys over 100,000 peacekeepers worldwide, (a figure set to increase by 30% over the next 6 months) and it moved over 800,000 personnel in 2006. Most new missions are now integrated, fulfilling a multi-dimensional peacekeeping role, in support of a political process, but with widening mandates to protect civilians and support peacebuilding initiatives. Despite the development of the other international organisations, the UN remains the only supranational organisation that has the capability to deploy, lead and sustain multiple, multi-dimensional peace operations. As such its influence is considerable and its guidance and principles for peacekeeping are seminal. It anticipates having to do more, more effectively, over the next decade.

11. The AU, with experience of sub regional interventions first deployed an AU force (AMIB) of over 3,000 into Burundi in 2003.¹¹ It now has deployments in Darfur (+7000) and Somalia (set to be 8000). These remain emergency deployments into areas where there is little peace to keep, and no assessed funding capability to support them. So the AU peacekeeping effort is largely funded bilaterally by donor states and/or by the EU, with associated frictions, given the lack of institutional capacity within the AU secretariat to manage the financial oversight demanded by the donors. The AU can deploy little or no civilian capacity, so the current effort is largely as an ad hoc military “fire brigade” with light, but rapidly deployable troops. Its comparative advantage lies in its ability to deploy quickly within the continent, with African solutions to African problems. Nevertheless, the AU’s vision is ambitious. Through the development of the African Standby Force based on five regional brigades found by the Regional Economic Communities (sub-regional organizations such

⁸ The EU produces over 25% of the world’s Gross National Product, provides 50% of international development funds and over 50% of world humanitarian aid.

⁹ In order to try to create some clear distinction between potential EU/WEU operations and those of NATO, the Petersberg tasks focused EU specialization on humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping tasks and crisis management involving combat forces.

¹⁰ The UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations before the new SG’s 2007 reform (which split the department into DPKO and DFS) was under 700 personnel.

¹¹ AMIB handed over to a UN mission ONUB in May 2004.

as IGAD, SADC and ECOWAS) the intent is to be able to deploy and manage complex and *integrated* peacekeeping operations of one or more brigades by 2010.

12. The EU has yet only a limited deployable peace keeping capacity. Nevertheless, it has recently gained integrated peace keeping experience: in Bosnia since 2004 (EUFOR Althea)¹² where it deployed over 6,000 peacekeepers; in support of UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR Congo in 2003 and 2006) which were both short military “surge” deployments; and in a variety of small, principally civilian and police advisory and training interventions in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. However, its Headline Goal 2010 has redefined the ambition level for the European Security and Defence Policy, and with the advent of initiatives such as the European Battlegroup, the EU can be expected to be a significant future contributor of integrated civilian, police and military capability in support of international peace and security.

13. NATO remains principally a defensive alliance with considerable spare capacity to support peace and stability through active engagement in crisis management and response. As such it is able to conduct the full range of missions from high to low intensity, for which it has the full spectrum of fully manned command HQs at strategic, operational and tactical level. Currently it is actively involved in providing the military component in two major peace operations in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR), deploying on these two missions over 52,000 troops. In addition, NATO is involved in supporting and stabilizing operations in the Balkans (other than Kosovo), the Mediterranean (a standing naval counter-terrorism task force), Sudan (support to AMIS and now UNAMID) and Iraq (a training mission). While putting great emphasis on the need for civil-military cooperation, its activities are essentially military, albeit in support of a political process, which it influences but does not control. Its vision is to develop the capability of a rapidly deployable, multi-national joint force, the NATO Response Force, of over 20,000 persons ready and able at five days notice to respond to crisis across the globe in support of peace and security.

14. Having reached the present in dissimilar ways, these different organisations now find themselves needing to inter-operate and coordinate in the field on peace operations. All the organisations have aspirations to do more, but a key question is whether they have the doctrinal guidance in place to match these aspirations and to help train and guide this effort. Ideally, doctrine should drive training and thereby focus capability. It is not clear that this has happened.

V. Existing Doctrines and Principles for UN, AU, EU and NATO Peace Operations

15. United Nations. As has already been identified, developing doctrinal guidance was not high on the list of priorities in establishing peacekeeping capability in international organisations. Expediency was. The UN experience is illustrative of this. Early peacekeeping between 1948 and the end of the Cold War was characterised by a pragmatic rather than a doctrinal approach. While the UN Charter gave little direction on peacekeeping, UN peacekeeping became identified with the three Pearson/Hammarskjöld principles of consent, neutrality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. These principles, and the individual mandates and directions that accompanied them, were generally sufficient for the peacekeeping deployments of this period, which largely dealt with inter-state conflict.¹³

¹² The EU under UN mandate SCR 1575 (2004) took over the peace operation in Bosnia from NATO’s SFOR in December 2004.

¹³ There were exceptions of course, such as the UN Congo mission in 1961, which was effectively a peace enforcement operation preventing a secessionist Katanga.

16. The end of the Cold War and the shift in the conflict paradigm, saw an attempt by the UN to review its doctrinal contribution (but not called as such) to international peace and security through “the Agenda for Peace” in 1992. The Agenda tried to tackle the difficult issues and the relationships between peacekeeping and peacebuilding generated in places such as Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. However, it was still essentially a codification of traditional peacekeeping, which centred around the deployment of lightly equipped peacekeepers, backed by Pearson/Hammarskjöld peacekeeping principles. It did not address the issues of decaying or partial consent nor of violence against civilians/genocide. Accordingly, UN peacekeeping came unstuck in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, where there was no peace to keep, and the mandates were unclear or insufficient. In 1995 “The Supplement to the Agenda for Peace” tried to address these conceptual deficiencies, but the tide for UN peacekeeping had turned; unilateral interventions or coalitions of the willing became the instrument of choice. So UN peacekeepers continued to muddle through without a doctrinal framework or much guidance. It was not until the “Panel on UN Peace Operations” (also known as the Brahimi Report) in 2000 that a rigorous conceptual analysis was undertaken of the principles, strengths, limits and factors which contribute to successful UN peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report was seminal in providing guidance for UN peacekeeping both within the Security Council and for peacekeeping practitioners in DPKO and in the field. But while it was an attempt to conceptualize UN policy and capture best practice from past experience, it was not written as a doctrine even though it contains many of the precepts that would contribute to doctrine. Thus, the only UN publication for peacekeeping to date which is recognizably a doctrine to help peacekeeping practitioners is the 1995 DPKO “General Guidelines for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”. This was issued as a low level training document rather than as a strategic level codification of UN peacekeeping doctrine and while containing much helpful guidance on peacekeeping, it was rooted in the era of traditional peacekeeping. It was not until 2005 that the UN, determined to build on the analysis and lessons identified in the Brahimi Report, set out to produce its first UN doctrine for peacekeeping, called the UN Capstone Doctrine project¹⁴. After 18 months of development and wide consultation, this work is concluding and the doctrine is scheduled to be published by the end of 2007.

17. This is not to say that UN peacekeepers have been without guidance. Source material arising from past experiences existed in a wealth of resolutions, mandates, directives, operational orders, after action reports, best practice reviews, etc., all available to the diligent researcher. But if a newly appointed Head of a UN Mission, UN Force Commander or Police Commissioner, with little time (and much stress) wanted the guidance of a single document codifying the essence of UN peacekeeping, it did not exist. The implication was that in such a vacuum, international peacekeepers, whether working within the UN, or on behalf of it through a mandated operation, or within a regional organisation, had no doctrinal guidance on peace operations from the global organisation charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁵ They therefore had to develop their own, largely arising from the work of those member states who believed that it was wrong to deploy their people and armed forces on operations, even peace operations, without doctrinal guidance. The result has been that the doctrine for keeping the peace developed by international organisations, other than the UN, has largely come out of *military* peace keeping experience.

18. African Union. Commendably, in developing the concept of the African Standby Force (ASF), the AU in 2005 put great emphasis on the development of a conceptual and doctrinal framework upon which to base its capacity for the conduct of peace operations. The product is the

¹⁴ Its latest iteration (Oct 07) is called “United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines”. For the purposes of this paper the shorter title UN Capstone Doctrine will be used.

¹⁵ UN Charter, Article 1.

ASF “Peace Support Operations Doctrine” which was distributed in draft form in November 2006. It has yet to be passed by the AU Commission and ratified by the African Council of Defence Chiefs, nevertheless, it acts as guidance material for the development and training of the integrated ASF capability.¹⁶ The African sub-regional organisations, particularly ECOWAS and SADC had already begun to develop their own doctrinal guidance for peace operations, and so were able to make a significant contribution to the ASF doctrine. However, these doctrines drew heavily on certain national military doctrines for peace operations.¹⁷ Given this lineage, and the need for a fast gestation process, the ASF doctrine is inevitably slanted towards the employment of the military component on peace operations rather than as a first-principles holistic or comprehensive doctrine for multi-disciplinary African peace activity. This was pragmatic and probably necessary, given the absence of any over-arching doctrinal guidance from the UN and the inexperience of the civilian component within the AU/ASF concept. The urgent need was for the AU to have some conceptual guidance framework upon which to base the training and development of its five regional brigades. This it now has. Furthermore, the ASF doctrine’s place in the political doctrinal hierarchy has to an extent been fixed by “AU Peacekeeping – A Vision for the ASF” draft document, produced in 2007, which once ratified is designed “to provide the conceptual basis for AU peacekeeping, in particular for the ASF”.¹⁸

19. European Union. The EU has had recent experience of integrating diplomatic, developmental, and humanitarian activity with judicial and security instruments (particularly the police). It has therefore, ab initio, a strong comparative advantage in the area of comprehensive and integrated peace operations. However, doctrinally, the EU remains constrained by the lack of agreement within its member states for its proposed new constitutional arrangements. The European Security Strategy has outlined its ambitions for a European security capability which takes its European Security and Defence Policy beyond the Petersberg tasks, into fields which include rapid reaction capabilities, strategic airlift coordination, standby aircraft carrier groups, crisis response as well as security sector reform, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation. Commensurate with its economic power, the EU has ambitious goals in the field of international peace and security. However, this vision remains dependent upon ratification of its new Constitution, which will allow for stronger supranational arrangements for defence capability than at present. Accordingly, there is, as yet, no EU doctrine for peace operations, although conceptual frameworks (such as the EU Approach) have been developed and experience across a broad range of discrete capabilities is being gained. The EU relies upon the best practice of its member states, and where applicable the UN and NATO, for its doctrinal framework to support and guide its various interventions in support of peace. Given the different evolution and role of these doctrines, when compared with the EU’s aims and purposes, this does not provide the ideal for clear conceptual guidance.

20. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Once it was clear that the Alliance would be moving into this area of peace operations, NATO was quick to develop a doctrine. It was not short of the staff capacity to do this. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.1, produced in 2001 was thorough and helpful, but was essentially a doctrine for the military component of a peace operation (such as NATO’s role in support of the UN in Kosovo). Its ancestry from US and UK doctrine for “operations other than war” is evident. It is currently in the process of being updated, and AJP-3.4.1A (2007) is the first draft of this revision. This latest draft recognizes the need for a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and places the military component firmly in the context

¹⁶ While called the African Standby Force its purpose is “to ensure that trained police, civilian and military formations, troops and individuals are rapidly available for deployment on AU mandated operations, including AU humanitarian missions”, AU Peacekeeping – A Vision for the ASF, Draft 2007.

¹⁷ For example, the British doctrine for peace support operations.

¹⁸ Ibid.

of a multi-disciplinary political lead. Unable, until now, to call on UN doctrine for guidance, it differs from the new UN capstone doctrine in a number of respects; some understandably military, but others concerned with principles of peacekeeping. However, as this NATO draft is still in an iterative phase, closer alignment with the UN Capstone doctrine, once the latter has been agreed and published, should not be difficult and clearly would be desirable.

21. In sum, all organisations studied are currently working on their emerging doctrine and so the process is a dynamic one. Only NATO has an agreed and ratified doctrine for peace support operations (AJP-3.4.1) and that is currently being rewritten. The fact that nothing is hard and fast and all are concerned to capture best practice provides a unique opportunity to harmonise the doctrines where harmonisation is needed.

Effect of Organizational Role and Structure

22. The make-up and structure of an organisation inevitably influences its doctrine. At one extreme is the nation state, which can tailor its doctrine precisely to its national interest and its political, military and developmental needs and capabilities. At the other extreme, is the UN with its 192 member states whose doctrine has to have a heterogeneous and multicultural resonance, but at the same time be relevant and useful for all its many users with their wide variety of experiences, cultures, structures and ethos. NATO, which has worked to develop interoperability for nearly 60 years (especially at the level of concepts and command and control systems) lies closer in this regard to the nation state than to the UN. It is a relatively homogenous grouping, with its 26 member states sharing a broadly similar Western culture, political and value system, history, and development. The same is true of the EU. The AU, with its 53 member states, is somewhere between the UN and NATO. While sharing a continental culture and a colonial past, there is little else which is homogenous. In shaping a doctrine for peace operations, NATO can therefore be more prescriptive and detailed in its direction, in the knowledge that its users share the ethos and understand the culture and practice described. The UN, on the other hand, has to walk a narrow path between the diverse views of its member states while somehow achieving a doctrinal consensus which has utility. It therefore needs to stick to principles and procedures which have precedence within the common law of 60 years of UN peacekeeping and which are understood by all. Nudging the collective thinking forward in these circumstances is an art form within the UN Secretariat. It is not a conceptual discipline, as it is with member states and to a lesser extent within NATO and the AU. It is therefore inevitable that there is a different style between the doctrines of the various organisations.

23. Despite these differences, empiricism is forcing emerging doctrines closer together. There are no purely military solutions to the problems of intra-state conflict. Thus NATO's doctrine for peace support operations, originally developed as a military doctrine for operations other than war, is changing towards a politically driven doctrine embracing the comprehensive approach. The EU, essentially an economic and political organisation, has no military doctrine and only a developing military capability, and so its conceptual thinking is already leaning towards multi-dimensional solutions to conflict, with its military in the supporting role. The AU, the newest of the international organisations, but with the most challenging in-tray, has been able to learn from the process of others, and while initially focusing its doctrine on the development of its ASF, is aware of the need to build its capacity for peace operations more holistically. This need has been reinforced by their recent experience in Darfur. Above all, the UN, after decades of doctrine-free pragmatism in the field on peace operations, has produced the first political doctrine to guide multi-dimensional peacekeeping, in line with its core role as the highest international authority for peace operations.

VI. Commonalities and Differences

24. As international peacekeeping has developed, so best practice has been shared. Thus, while the genesis and role of the organisations has been different, there are common themes running through them all. These themes are the distillation of the experience of member states and international organisations within the peacekeeping community; distillations shared and promulgated by the many international peace training and development centres.¹⁹ They are also the result of a developing institutional effort to coordinate with international partners. All organisations declare close coordination with the UN as one of their key roles. And for its part, and within the constraints of its lean structure, the UN does likewise. Accordingly, all doctrines agree on the important issues of the need for a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach to the causes of conflict in order to achieve a sustainable peace. Not all can deliver it, but the concept is understood. Equally, all agree on the need for integrated planning, the close coordination of security with developmental and humanitarian activity, the unity of effort under political leadership in the field and the need for long-term engagement. Unsurprisingly at this stage, both the AU and NATO tackle these issues and themes largely from a military perspective, as part of the environmental context which needs to be understood, before going on to place the military role within this context. In contrast, the UN's Capstone Doctrine, being a political and not a military doctrine, has these themes at the heart of its thesis, intending more specialized subordinate doctrines (such as for the military, police, field administration, etc.) to be developed in cascade. This difference is not inappropriate as the UN needs to set the international *doctrinal* framework for peace operations into which other organisations (under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) should fit. For the first time, the UN is now in a position to do this.

25. The Scope of the Doctrines. The most significant difference between the doctrines is that the UN's doctrine is specific to UN peacekeeping. It has deliberately limited itself to defining and giving guidance on the core business of UN peacekeeping and avoids discussing the full spectrum of peace operations. Key to this is the concept that UN peacekeeping is not an international tool that should be used for every type of situation on the escalating ladder of conflict. UN peacekeeping has its limits, both in terms of the deliverable capabilities and of the will of the international community to use the UN peacekeeping instrument in the peace enforcement role.²⁰ So while the UN's doctrine recognizes that the difference between peace enforcement and peacekeeping is often blurred (especially at the local and tactical level), its central premise is that UN peacekeeping only has traction where there is a peace to keep, and where the main parties have signed up to a political process. Significantly, the doctrines for NATO and the AU are called doctrines for peace support operations. This name recognises that the doctrines cover a wider spectrum of conflict than simply peacekeeping activity²¹ and reflects NATO's thinking that "all operations are operations and can be approached in fundamentally the same manner"²². This is the central reason why both NATO and AU doctrines look more military in content and style than the UN's Capstone Doctrine.

¹⁹ The International Association for Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) met in Stockholm in September 2007 to discuss, inter alia, the impact of the UN's Capstone Doctrine upon international training for peace operations.

²⁰ Historically, Katanga in 1961 excepted, the Security Council has chosen to mandate regional organisations or coalitions of the willing for this role.

²¹ However, NATO's latest draft doctrine for PSO stops short of discussing Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN). Currently this is left to another AJP; a decision which is due for review.

²² NATO AJP-3(A).

26. The Variety of “Fundamental” Principles. The other related area of difference in the doctrines is in the handling and identification of the various fundamental principles of peace (or peace support) operations. These principles are significant for they shape the character of the doctrine and thus the peace operation. Interestingly, both NATO and the AU have endorsed the pre-eminence of the traditional Pearson/Hammarskjöld principles, in line with what was the historical UN position. But, in recognition of the more complex demands of current peace operations, they both have had to extend these principles, but in different ways. NATO identifies two “Fundamental Attributes” of peace support operations: the Comprehensive Approach and Campaign Authority. It then identifies the three principles of Consent, Impartiality and Restraint in the Use of Force (but all nuanced to meet the requirements of NATO peace support operations), before listing “other principles of peace support operations”, namely Security, Credibility, Transparency, Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness, Legitimacy, Proactive Action and Freedom of Action.

27. The AU meanwhile calls the three Pearson/Hammarskjöld principles for traditional peacekeeping “Fundamental Concepts Underpinning Peace Support Operations”, but force is dealt with simply under the heading “Use of Force”.²³ The AU then goes on to describe the “Core Functions” of peace support operations, which are listed as “The Fundamentals” (these fundamentals derive from combat operations, but are adapted for PSO namely: intelligence, shaping and controlling, resolution or striking, and sustaining the operation), the “Mission Plan”, a “Manoeuvrist Approach”, and “Mission Command”. This is all very military. Then under the heading of “The Conduct of an Operation”, it identifies the “Guiding Principles for the Conduct of a PSO” and lists Objective, Perseverance, Unity of Effort, Flexibility, Legitimacy, Security, Consent, Credibility, Mutual Respect, Transparency of Operation, Freedom of Military Movement and Civil-Military Cooperation and Liaison. It is noticeable that both NATO and the AU, in an effort to capture the nature of peace operations, but also to give military guidance to their target audience, have conflated the two intents in their doctrines. It is also noticeable that there is common ground in their principles, as most of these principles and concepts appear, in some form or other, in the *military* doctrines of individual member states.

28. As already described, the UN’s Capstone Doctrine, has started from a different premise. It is not an attempt to give military guidance. It is, as its introduction identifies, an attempt “to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations, within the broader context of international efforts to help countries emerging from conflict achieve a sustainable peace”²⁴. It “sets out the basic principles that are needed to guide the planning and conduct of UN peace operations”. In doing so, “it reflects the major lessons learned from sixty years of UN peacekeeping and draws on landmark reports of the Secretary-General and their legislative responses, as well as resolutions and statements of the principal organs of the UN”. It attempts to codify existing and best practice in order to give ready guidance. It is not revolutionary but evolutionary. Given the limitations of any doctrine for the UN, which must capture the diverse views of its 193 member states, it could not be anything else. Unsurprisingly, its principles contain familiar but well seasoned concepts that have stood the test of field operations. It is of note, however, that in the extensive consultation process for the UN’s doctrine’s development, it was the selection and nature of these principles that caused the most discussion.

29. The UN has identified six guiding principles, which serve to characterise contemporary UN peacekeeping operations. As recommended in the Brahimi Report, the UN has strongly endorsed

²³ This contrasts with the traditional “non use of force except in self defence”, or NATO’s “restraint in the use of force”; nevertheless in the discussion of this principle all doctrines have common ground in identifying the need for proportionately, restraint, and careful calibration to minimize collateral damage within peace operations.

²⁴ UN Capstone Doctrine Draft 4

the three Pearson/Hammarskjöld principles,²⁵ but all have been judiciously updated to reflect the new environment. Thus “non-use of force except in self defence” has been expanded to “non-use of force except in self defence and defence of the mandate” to cover the use of force necessary under the mandated responsibility to protect civilians in imminent threat of physical violence. In addition, the Capstone identifies three further principles that UN experience has shown are needed to guide contemporary, multi-dimensional peacekeeping: legitimacy and credibility (both seen in some form, but with different emphasis in NATO and the AU’s doctrines) and most significantly the promotion of national and local ownership. This final principle, cardinal to successful peacebuilding, is largely absent from the other doctrines. In handling discussion on these principles for doctrinal purposes the UN has placed the principle in the context of the needed activity. Thus “The Meaning of Consent and Impartiality”; “The Need for Restraint in the Use of Force”; “The Importance of Legitimacy and Credibility”; and “The Need to Promote National and Local Ownership”. Given the political sensitivity amongst member states of some of these issues this seems a helpful treatment.²⁶ The UN has steered clear of including other principles, which contribute to military effectiveness, on the basis that these remain germane, but are the business of subordinate doctrines of individual member states, who contribute to the UN’s military component.

VII. Gaps and Weaknesses for Future Operational Requirements

30. It is helpful that all the doctrines for international organisations are in the process of development. All declare their doctrines to be dynamic, living documents, needing regular review to reflect the changing environment. Accordingly, while there are gaps between them, there is opportunity to close these gaps by better alignment. Fundamental to this will be the publication and distribution of the UN’s Capstone document. This document should set the standard and principles for peacekeeping which the other doctrines can then follow. The gaps that do exist are largely through the absence of this UN top level guidance. This argues strongly for no further delay in the release of the Capstone Doctrine. In this way it may be expected that issues such as the apparent doctrinal muddle over the fundamental principles for peace operations will be resolved, with regional doctrines following the UN lead.

31. Perhaps of more significance are the areas where the UN and the other organisations do not go. The UN’s doctrine says little on peace enforcement operations, and yet regional organisations are working in this field, often under a UN mandate and alongside the UN.²⁷ While the UN Capstone is clearly concerned only with UN-led peacekeeping, there must be scope in the future for the UN to give more guidance on UN mandated peace operations. Similarly, the UN will need in future to develop some doctrinal guidance to help those involved in true hybrid operations, such as UNAMID in Darfur, in which UN and AU components are working within the same, but joint, chain of command. Some best practice must be established for this to happen, but the requirement should be registered. For its part, the AU’s doctrine for the ASF needs to become more than a military doctrine for its regional Standby Brigades. While the AU does not aspire to replicate the full UN multi-agency, multi-dimensional capability brought to a UN mission, it does recognize that the AU must develop a politically led, integrated capability to address the continent’s post conflict challenges. At present the conceptual development needed to articulate a comprehensive AU peace support capability is in a very early stage and is largely absent from the AU’s ASF doctrine. This matters if the ASF is to have a capability, which can interoperate with, or hand over to, a UN mission. UNAMID will no doubt provide a test bed for this requirement.

²⁵ The latest draft of the Capstone Doctrine calls these “founding or bedrock principles”.

²⁶ Vide discussions in 2007 in the UN General Assembly’s Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations on the issue of the principle of “non-use of force except in self-defence”.

²⁷ e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Somalia.

32. NATO is a regional security organisation and does not aspire to deliver the full spectrum of capability needed for a fully integrated peace operation. Its speciality will remain the provision of the Alliance's military component in support of a peace operation. However to do this, its doctrine recognizes that it needs "to interface with host nation security mechanisms and international organisations such as the UN and EU and NGOs."²⁸ It also recognizes that its successful (military) end state is only an enabler (or a stepping stone) to achieving the overall mandated political end-state. As it currently stands, its doctrine is descriptive of the organisations with which it must interface but it gives little guidance for this process. Future drafts will benefit from the UN Capstone doctrine which will help shape and place NATO's contribution to peace operations. The EU is in the position of the UN in the 1990s, with some practical experience and many directives but no overarching doctrine to codify best practice in the field. Given its intention to deploy significant military capability in the future within the structure of integrated missions, this must be addressed.

VIII. Better Harmonization of Effort or Just Improved Interoperability?

33. This question was discussed at the September 2007 Stockholm meeting of the International Association for Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), where over 50 member states were represented, as well as the AU, EU and NATO. In common was their responsibility to train, or frame the training, of civilian, police and military peacekeepers. While not a General Assembly Committee it was a powerful focus group of experienced peacekeeping practitioners and trainers. Central to discussions was the virtuous cycle of institutional strengthening, namely: policy and doctrine drive training, which drives operations, which need evaluation leading to lessons learned, which in turn drive changes in policy and doctrine; and so the cycle repeats itself. There was general agreement that the UN's new Capstone Doctrine was going to be instrumental in driving training and best practice throughout the peacekeeping community. Most did not see it as replacing their own national doctrines, but that it would be profoundly influential and would set the general tone or philosophy of international peace operations. As such, through the effect of the institutional strengthening cycle, the Capstone would have a positive effect upon operations, especially where there was a need to interoperate. Their conclusions may be summarized as believing that at the strategic level there needed to be a harmonisation of doctrine across international and national organisations.²⁹ This recognizes that separate organisations have different requirements, structures and roles, but when operating together in the field of peace operations they must operate in harmony. The UN Capstone Doctrine was seen in general as being instrumental in providing the sheet of music (to labour the metaphor) for all to follow, to allow this harmony to take place. This thought is captured in the Introduction to the UN Capstone Doctrine:

*"This document is a multi-dimensional doctrine to embrace the complex operations of today.... In this respect, it does not override the peacekeeping doctrines of individual member states and does not address military tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), which remain the prerogative of individual member states. It is nonetheless, intended to support civilian, police and military personnel who are training and preparing to serve in UN peacekeeping operations. Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) may wish to draw on this document for their respective peacekeeping training and pre-deployment programmes."*³⁰

²⁸ NATO AJP-3.4.1(A), Draft 1.

²⁹ The Oxford English Dictionary defines harmonious in this sense as "not discordant, forming a pleasing or consistent whole, free from conflict".

³⁰ Introduction to UN Capstone Document, Draft 4.

Some delegates at the IAPTC felt that this could be worded more strongly, but most believed the balance was right and that regional organisations and member states had their own specific requirements and would adjust naturally where needed in pursuit of best practice. Earlier in its Introduction, the Capstone Doctrine says:

*“The present document constitutes the highest level in the doctrine and guidance framework for UN peacekeeping. It is in effect **the strategic guidance** for this body of material. Any subordinate directives, guidelines standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials **should conform to the principles set out in this guidance document.**”*³¹ (Author’s bold emphasis).

The UN is clearly here referring to its own publications, and not to those of other organisations or member states; but there was a sense at the IAPTC that this more universal conformity would and should happen naturally over time.

34. Even NATO, after 60 years of effort has not managed to achieve standardization except in key military areas like aircraft refuelling and certain reporting procedures. Recognizing the realities and politics of national interests, it has been satisfied to drive for interoperability. This pragmatic approach is followed by other international organisations. The UN, by leaving the business of TTPs to member states, is consistent with NATO, AU and EU practice. Nevertheless, in the field on operations, there does need to be clarity. Participants at the IAPTC in Stockholm felt that at the tactical level (in the field) there needed to be better interoperability of training, doctrine and practice. This cannot always be left to a peace mission’s senior leadership (e.g. the Force Commander or Police Commissioner) in their directives to their components and contingents. Language and the meaning of doctrinal concepts are often the source of the lack of clarity. Much is lost in translation and in any case, the same words often mean different things to different components, nations or organisations. All organisations have difficulties with these aspects and this is compounded when one organisation is working alongside, or handing over to, another. The UN Capstone Doctrine only goes so far in addressing this issue, rooted as it is at the strategic level. The IAPTC felt that the UN had a role in providing the subordinate body of guidance which would lead to better interoperability of practice and procedure at the field level for all components, be they civilian, police or military. In this way an individual or contingent working within a UN, AU, EU or NATO peace operation would share a consistency of doctrinal language at the tactical level which would allow for improved understanding and better interoperability.

35. In sum, it is clear that the UN’s Capstone Doctrine will have a great impact in driving better harmonisation of doctrine, and therefore training and practice, at the strategic level. Its impact will be less significant at the tactical level, where member states will remain in the lead. But where there remains a need for improved interoperability, it will only be through more doctrinal guidance at the tactical level. No international organisations tackle this issue, preferring to leave this to the training centres and national doctrines that serve them. Both these sources take their guidance from where they can, and in the absence of tactical doctrine from higher level organisations, this tends to come from individual member states. As such it is often military. By delivering the Capstone Doctrine, the UN has taken on the responsibility of its role as the pre-eminent organisation for international peace and security. However, the job is only half done. There is a clear expectation and need among the regional organisations and member states for further guidance at the tactical level to develop a consistency of language and definition in order to drive better training and best practice in the field. If the virtuous cycle of institutional strengthening is not powered, it is not a cycle but

³¹ Ibid.

merely a two-dimensional diagram. It has to move in order to strengthen the institution, and movement requires energy and resources, both human and financial. The challenge for the international community, through the UN, is to ensure that all stages of the cycle are sufficiently resourced. Only then can peacekeeping doctrine develop and adjust so as to drive training, operations and best practice, smoothly and continuously.

Recommendations

- *Properly staffed doctrine cells in the UN (none at present, apart from two men and a kettle. c.f. NATO) to drive the institutional cycle; AU likewise and who should be civilian as well as military. Currently all AU doctrine being written by middle rank military staff officers.*
- *UN to commit to review current Capstone at a given date and also press on with developing its subordinate doctrines for peacekeeping to allow the cascade of best practice;*
- *UN to develop doctrine for hybrid operations which may have to include UN support to PE;*
- *Better/closer liaison cells between international organisation (viz UN to AU);*
- *NATO/AU to develop political rather than military doctrines; to set their own “capstones” to provide the political agenda for their deployed effort;*
- *EU to write its own distinct doctrine once UN’s developed and the EU constitutional barriers have been climbed;*
- *Better use to be made of the IAPTC to share best practices and drive interoperability of peacekeeping training;*
- *The doctrinal development of international peace operations to be one of the annual themes addressed by the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations.*